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Abstract
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good (with private, independent values) is immune to a simple form
of collusion, where one bidder may bribe the other to commit to stay
away from the auction (i.e. submit a bid of zero). First, we consider
a situation in which only a bribe of a ﬁxed size may be oﬀered. There
are precisely two equilibria in this extended game: a “bribing” and a
“no-bribing” equilibrium. While the bribing equilibrium is naturally
stable, the no-bribing equilibrium is shown to fail several standard
reﬁnements on out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Second, we consider the
case in which bribes of any size may be oﬀered. Robust equilibria in
this situation involve low briber-types revealing themselves through
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11 Introduction
Our goal is to examine the extent to which an auction mechanism is immune
to a simple form of collusion in which one bidder may bribe another to leave
the auction.Speciﬁcally, we consider a second-price or English auction where
two buyers have private information about their valuations for a good.Before
the auction begins, one of the buyers has the opportunity to oﬀer the other
a bribe in exchange for the other’s commitment to remove himself from the
auction (or bid zero).We analyze two versions of this model: one in which
the amount of the bribe is exogenously ﬁxed (e.g. representing a ﬁxed “favor”
whose transfer is undetectable), and one in which the bribe can be chosen
to be any amount (e.g. oﬀering money). With respect to a given equilibrium
concept for this extended game, we examine whether the second-price auction
is “bribe-proof” in the following sense.
We say that the auction is strongly bribe-proof if bribing does not occur
in any equilibrium of the extended game.We show that the second-price
auction fails this requirement under any reasonable equilibrium concept: un-
der both ﬁxed and variable bribes, there exists a robust equilibrium in which
bribing occurs.
We say that the auction is weakly bribe-proof if there exists an equilib-
rium in which bribing does not occur.While there is a sequential equilibrium
in which no bribe is oﬀered, this equilibrium turns out not to be robust.We
provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions such that the no-bribing equi-
librium does not survive iterated deletion of dominated strategies (or the
Intuitive Criterion) in the ﬁxed bribes model.Furthermore, the no-bribing
equilibrium always fails other common reﬁnements.
The concept of bribe-proofness is a practical and reasonable requirement,
as bribing agreements represent the simplest and crudest form of collusion.
A bribing contract like ours is relatively easy to enforce; participation in the
auction is often veriﬁable, and the contract does not rely on post-auction
payments.
The bribing contracts we study certainly do not represent all possible
2collusive arrangements.However, the availability of even these can induce
collusion and ineﬃciencies in the second-price auction.One interpretation
of our results is that, in the private-values auction environment, no eﬃcient
and strategy-proof mechanism is resistant to very simple forms of bidder col-
lusion, even if the buyers have incomplete information regarding each others’
valuations.
1.1 Related literature
Bribing contracts have been analyzed by Schummer (2000) in the context of
dominant strategy implementation.In a general collective decision problem,
he calls a mechanism bribe-proof if, given player i’s type, player j has no
incentive to pay i to commit to misreport his type, even when j reports
truthfully.Schummer ( 2000) shows that only constant mechanisms are bribe-
proof.In this paper, we extend this type of analysis to a Bayesian setting,
where players do not know each others’ types, and where the decision problem
of allocating an object is being solved with a second-price auction.
Our paper also contributes to a growing literature on collusion in auctions,
including Graham and Marshall (1987), Mailath and Zemsky (1991), McAfee
and McMillan (1992), and Marshall and Marx (2002).1 These authors model
collusion by assuming that a subset of buyers congregates before the auction,
and play some kind of “collusive mechanism” or “knock-oﬀ auction.” Graham
and Marshall (1987) show that a group of bidders can collude in an incentive
compatible and ex-ante budget balanced way by simply asking low-valuation
bidders in the group to drop out of the auction.Payments are made to
all group members before determining who should drop out, while after the
auction, the group’s high-valuation member makes a payment back to the
group only if the manipulation produced ex-post gains for him.Mailath and
Zemsky (1991) provide a more sophisticated mechanism that also achieves
ex-post budget balance, and identify the optimal collusive contract subject
1Laﬀont and Martimort (2000) have a two-agent public goods setup where the mod-
elling of collusion is similar to that of this literature.
3to this constraint.
The main diﬀerence between our extended game and the way collusion
is modelled in this literature is that we consider a diﬀerent (and particular)
bribing stage.Instead of the agents jointly designing a collusive side-contract,
one of our agents is ﬁxed as having the opportunity to oﬀer a contract to
the other agent.2 This is important because in our model the “designer”
of the mechanism, bidder j, has private information, and his goal is not
the maximization of the joint surplus, but rather his own.The result of
this diﬀerence is that in our game, signalling is an issue, and the bribing
equilibrium is not eﬃcient.
In previous work on bidding rings, the ring serves as a device to siphon
proﬁts from the seller to the ring members, and overall eﬃciency is not lost
(under ex-ante symmetry) as a consequence.In our model, though, bribing
leads to a loss in social surplus.We do not assert that our way of modelling
collusion is better, but we think that it is an interesting alternative, especially,
that ineﬃciencies arising from bribing have not been considered before.
1.2 Outline of Results
In Section 3 we start with a model in which the briber may only oﬀer an
exogenously ﬁxed bribe amount b.We show that in this model, there are
precisely two equilibria in pure strategies: (i) a bribing equilibrium in which
high briber types oﬀer the bribe, and low acceptor types accept it, and (ii) a
no-bribing equilibrium in which the bribe is never oﬀered.
Since the bribing equilibrium has full support on the action space, it is ro-
bust to the usual equilibrium reﬁnements of signalling games.We argue that
the no-bribing equilibrium, however, is not robust.First, we show that it fails
the iterated deletion of dominated strategies if and only if the amount of the
bribe is suﬃciently large compared to a certain function of the distribution
2Furthermore, we restrict the set of available contracts to “bribing contracts,” that is,
a transfer from j to i conditional on i bidding zero.
4of types.3
Second, regardless of the distribution of types, the no-bribing equilib-
rium does not survive standard equilibrium reﬁnements (such as D1 or Per-
fect Sequential Equilibrium).It also fails an intuitive restriction on out-of-
equilibrium beliefs that we introduce in Section 3.3.To brieﬂy describe this
reﬁnement, we require that the support of i’s out-of-equilibrium beliefs re-
garding the briber’s type is restricted to a uniquely deﬁned “briber’s club”—a
set of briber-types that is equivalent to the set of types for whom it is prof-
itable to be associated with that set, as long as i’s beliefs are restricted to
that set.We show that beliefs on that support cannot be part of a no-bribing
equilibrium.
In Section 4 we turn to the case of “endogenous bribe amounts,” i.e.,
when the briber may choose to oﬀer any amount b.The equilibrium be-
havior found in the case of a ﬁxed bribe can be supported in this model as
well, though sometimes only with unintuitive out-of-equilibrium beliefs.In
particular, the no-bribing equilibrium is incompatible with standard reﬁne-
ments for signalling games.4 We believe that the most plausible, interesting,
and robust equilibrium is the unique bribing equilibrium in continuous and
weakly monotonic strategies.It is a “mostly-separating” equilibrium, in the
sense that any briber type below a certain threshold oﬀers a unique amount b
as a function of his type, while all types above the threshold oﬀer the same
amount.All bribes are accepted with positive probability, and the highest
bribe is always accepted.The allocation of the good in this equilibrium is
ineﬃcient with positive probability.
Section 5 numerically illustrates our results for the uniform distribution
of types.Proofs are collected in Appendix I, while a discussion of standard
reﬁnements is relegated to Appendix II.
3This necessary and suﬃcient condition holds if the distribution function is convex.
4In Appendix II, we show that in the variable bribes model, any no-bribing equilibrium
fails Cho and Sobel’s (1990) D1 criterion.
52 The Bribing Contract
Consider a second-price (Vickrey) auction for a single indivisible good, with
two risk-neutral bidders i and j.The buyers have private valuations, θi,θ j ∈
[0,1], drawn independently according to the same diﬀerentiable c.d.f. F.We
assume that 0 <F  (x) < ∞ for all x ∈ [0,1].Everything is commonly
known except the valuations, which are privately known by the buyers who
hold them.
We modify the second-price auction to model bribing in the following
way.After the buyers learn their valuations, but before the auction starts,
bidder j has an opportunity to oﬀer a bribe b to bidder i in exchange for i’s
commitment not to bid.If i accepts the bribe, he is committed to making a
bid of 0 in the auction; we are assuming that the bribing contract is enforce-
able.If i rejects the bribe or if j doesn’t oﬀer a bribe in the ﬁrst place, then
the game proceeds as a second-price auction.
We provide results for two cases: (Section 3)w h e nb is given exogenously,
so j decides whether to bribe but not how much to oﬀer; and (Section 4)
when j may also choose the amount of the bribe b.One interesting aspect of
this game is that buyer j’s decision whether or not to oﬀer a bribe (and the
amount oﬀered) reveals information regarding his type.This signalling eﬀect
adds much complication to a Bayesian model, and makes out-of-equilibrium
beliefs an important issue.5 In a second-price auction, however, if a bribe is
oﬀered but it is declined, then the players’ beliefs about each other’s type be-
comes irrelevant, since bidders have an incentive to bid truthfully regardless
of their information.
Formally, the game we describe above involves three stages: a stage where
bidder j decides whether to oﬀer a bribe, a stage where i decides whether
to accept an oﬀer (if made), and the second-price auction stage.In order to
simplify the presentation, however, we do not explicitly model the bidders’
behavior in the auction stage.We assume that bidders bid truthfully in
5In our model, out-of-equilibrium beliefs aﬀect what would happen if j oﬀered a bribe
that is not expected.
6the second-price auction, except of course when bidder i accepts a bribe, in
which case he is forced to bid zero.6 If a bribe b is oﬀered and accepted,
then the payoﬀs to i and j are b and θj − b, respectively.Otherwise, the
payoﬀ to the bidder with the highest type is max(θi,θ j) − min(θi,θ j), while
the other bidder receives zero.We formalize the deﬁnitions of strategies and
equilibrium concepts in each of the following two sections.
3 Fixed Bribe Amount
In this section we assume that the amount that j can oﬀer, b ≤ E(θi), is
exogenously ﬁxed, and that the briber chooses only whether to oﬀer it.One
interpretation of this model is that j has a car, and on the day of the auction
he tells i “Take the keys to my car and leave town.”
In this model, a (pure) strategy for bidder j prescribes for each type θj
a decision of whether to oﬀer the bribe b.Hence it can be represented by
the set B ⊆ [0,1] of types that oﬀer the bribe.A strategy for bidder i
prescribes for each type θi a decision of whether to accept b if oﬀered; it can
be represented by the set A ⊆ [0,1] of types that would accept the bribe if
it were oﬀered.We make the innocuous (see Proposition 1) assumption that
these strategy-representing sets are measurable.
A sequential equilibrium is a pair of strategies (A,B) and a posterior belief
distribution, µ, which satisfy the usual consistency and rationality conditions
for each type.7
Some of our results involve equilibria whose description includes a parti-
tion of the set of types.As in many such games with a continuum of types,
a pair of equilibria may exist which diﬀer only in the behavior of a single
6This assumption is innocuous since our most interesting results concern equilibria
in undominated strategies. It does, however, rule out equilibria (in weakly dominated
strategies) in which bidder j threatens to bid the maximum amount in the second-price
auction, forcing i (if he believes this) to accept the bribe regardless of his type. Since our
emphasis is on when bribing equilibria are the only “reasonable” ones, our results are not
weakened by this assumption.
7See Sect. 8.3, Fudenberg and Tirole (2000).
7(borderline) type.In order to describe such equilibria more concisely, we
introduce the following notation.For any 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, we write [0,a  to mean
“[0,a]o r[ 0 ,a).” Similarly,  a,1] means “[a,1] or (a,1].” This notation facil-
itates the description of “essentially unique” equilibria, where certain types
on interval boundaries may behave in indeterminate (and irrelevant) ways.
Our ﬁrst result describes the structure of all sequential equilibria in the
model with a ﬁxed bribe b.Strategies are described by sets which are 2-
partitions of [0,1].
Proposition 1 In any sequential equilibrium, the set of types that oﬀer a
bribe is of the form  B,1] and the set of types that accept the bribe is of the
form [0,A ,w h e r eB<1 implies b<B<A≤ 1.
Proof: For a given equilibrium, denote the set of types that oﬀer the bribe
as B, and the set of types that accept the bribe as A.When B is non-empty,
if player i accepts the bribe then it must exceed the proﬁt he would get in
the auction, given that θj ∈ B.In other words, if θi ∈ A then
b ≥ Eθj[(θi − θj)1{θj≤θi} | θj ∈ B]( 1 )
where 1X is the indicator function for event X.If this inequality holds for
some θi then it holds for any θ 
i <θ i.Therefore A =[ 0 ,A .If B is empty then
a similar argument (in which the posterior based on F is replaced by the out-
of-equilibrium beliefs) shows that for any beliefs supporting the sequential
equilibrium, A must be an interval.
To show that B is also an interval, deﬁne B =i n fB.If B =1t h e nw e
are done.Otherwise, since i can infer θj ≥ B from the fact that the bribe
was oﬀered, he has an incentive to accept the bribe if his type is less than
B + b.This follows because i’s proﬁt in the second-price auction is at most
θi − B ≤ b.Therefore A ≥ min{1,B+ b} >B .
For any θj ∈ B, the payoﬀ from oﬀering the bribe must be at least as
8great as his unconditional payoﬀ in the second-price auction, that is,
F(A)(θj − b)+Eθi[(θj − θi)1(A<θi≤θj)] ≥ Eθi[(θj − θi)1(θi≤θj)]. (2)
Diﬀerentiating both the left and right hand sides,
∂LHS(θj)
∂θj




When θj <A , the left hand side increases in θj strictly faster than the right
hand side does.Therefore, for any θj ∈ B for which B ≤ θj <A ,a n da n y
θ 
j >θ j,e q n .( 2) holds strictly with respect to θ 
j.This implies θ 
j ∈ B,a n d
therefore B is of the form  B,1].Furthermore, eqn.( 2) cannot hold at θj = b,
hence B>b . 
3.1 The Bribing Equilibrium
Our next result states that regardless of the distribution and the amount of
the bribe, an essentially unique bribing equilibrium exists.In it, high types
oﬀer the bribe while low types accept it.Since there is an overlap between
these sets, ineﬃciency occurs with positive probability.
Proposition 2 For any b ∈ (0,E(θi)], there exists a sequential equilibrium
in which bribing occurs. Moreover, all equilibria in which a bribe is oﬀered
with positive probability are essentially equivalent: there exist Ab, Bb such
that in any equilibrium where bribing occurs, the sets of bribers and acceptors
are  Bb,1] and [0,A b , respectively.
This equilibrium can be shown to be the unique one to satisfy Grossman
and Perry’s (1986) Perfect Sequential Equilibrium.Since both of j’s actions
are used in equilibrium, it clearly satisﬁes any reasonable reﬁnement.We
discuss reﬁnements in more detail in Section 3.3 and Appendix II.
93.2 The No-Bribing Equilibrium
An equilibrium in which bribing does not occur (a “no-bribing equilibrium”)
can be supported when bidder i believes that only type θj =0w o u l do ﬀ e ra
bribe.In this case, his optimal strategy is to accept the bribe when his type
is such that θi ∈ [0,b .Then, bidder j never could beneﬁt from oﬀering the
bribe, hence bribing would not occur.These out-of-equilibrium beliefs are
unreasonable, though, since for types θj <b , oﬀering the bribe is a strictly
dominated strategy (as long as it is accepted with positive probability).
We examine two reﬁnements that rule out such unreasonable beliefs.
First, we consider iteratively deleting weakly dominated strategies.Proposi-
tion 3 provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition under which this reﬁne-
ment rules out no-bribing equilibria.In Section 3.3, we introduce an intuitive
reﬁnement that is in the spirit of Cho and Kreps’ (1987) Intuitive Criterion,
but slightly stronger.Proposition 4 shows that a no-bribing equilibrium must
fail this reﬁnement.8
To discuss these reﬁnements, it is helpful to deﬁne the briber-type who
would be indiﬀerent between oﬀering the bribe and not oﬀering it, given that
every acceptor type θi ∈ [0,1] would accept the bribe.
Deﬁnition 1 For any b ∈ [0,E(θi)] deﬁne θb to satisfy
θ
b − b =
  θb
0 (θ
b − θi)dF(θi). (3)
One can check that θb is unique and well-deﬁned by this equation.
The following result considers the consequences of iteratively eliminat-
ing weakly dominated strategies.Since “order matters” when eliminating
weakly dominated strategies, for simplicity we restrict attention to the case
of eliminating every weakly dominated strategy in each round of deletion.
We call this maximal elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
8In Appendix II, we show that no-bribing equilibria fail Cho and Sobel’s (1990)D 1
criterion and Grossman and Perry’s (1986) concept of Perfect Sequential Equilibrium.
10Proposition 3 For all b ∈ (0,E(θi)), there exists a no-bribing sequential
equilibrium that survives the iterated maximal elimination of weakly domi-
nated strategies if and only if
b>E[θi | θi ≤ θ
b + b]( 4 )
Condition (4) fails to hold, for example, if the distribution function is
convex, in which case iterated dominance rules out the no-bribing equilib-
rium.On the other hand, for example, if F(x)=xα with 0 <α<1, then
eqn.( 4) holds for small b.
Remark 1 Reasoning similar to that used in the proof of Proposition 3
can be used to show that there is a no-bribing equilibrium satisfying Cho
and Kreps’ (1987) Intuitive Criterion if and only if eqn.( 4) is satisﬁed.
Roughly speaking, the Intuitive Criterion requires the acceptor to form out-
of-equilibrium beliefs that place no probability on any briber type who could
not hope to gain a payoﬀ higher than his equilibrium payoﬀ, as long as the
acceptor plays some best response strategy.Since a best response for the
acceptor must involve an interval [0,A] of accepting types, no briber with
type θj ≤ θb could hope to do better oﬀering the bribe than he does when
not oﬀering it (as in equilibrium).Hence, (out-of-equilibrium) beliefs for
the acceptor must have support only on [θb,1], and a conclusion similar to
that of Proposition 3 is reached.It may also be noted that in our model,
the Intuitive Criterion is equivalent to the (stronger) iterated version of that
condition, deﬁned by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p.449).
3.3 A Reﬁnement on Out-of-Equilibrium Beliefs
When eqn.( 4) holds, we construct a no-bribing equilibrium (in the proof
of Proposition 3) by using out-of-equilibrium beliefs for bidder i that are
“skewed downward” in the following sense.When j unexpectedly oﬀers the
bribe, i believes that j is very likely to have a type close to the lowest one
that could conceivably oﬀer the bribe after iterated deletion of weakly dom-
11inated strategies.Such beliefs run counter to the intuition (established by
diﬀerentiating eqn.( 2)) that if type θj has an incentive to oﬀer a bribe, then
so does any type θ 
j >θ j.Although these skewed beliefs are permissible, one
may ﬁnd a sequential equilibrium whose existence depends on them to be
less appealing than other, more robust equilibria.
Cho and Sobel’s (1990) D1 criterion eliminates such beliefs by requiring
that only types that are “most likely to gain” from deviating be given weight
in i’s posterior beliefs.It turns out (see Appendix II) that in a no-bribing
equilibrium, the types of j that are most likely gain from oﬀering the bribe
are the ones whose expected payment in a second-price auction exceeds the
bribe.9 By inducing such beliefs, it is not hard to see that the no-bribing
equilibrium is ruled out by this reﬁnement.
These considerations motivate us to introduce what we consider to be a
more intuitive reﬁnement on out-of-equilibrium beliefs.It is somewhat in the
spirit of Cho and Kreps’ (1987) Intuitive Criterion.However, it turns out
to have stronger consequence in our model, since a no-bribing equilibrium
cannot satisfy it regardless of the distribution F.
To provide the motivation for our reﬁnement, ﬁrst consider an equilib-
rium in which a bribe is never oﬀered by j—we generalize and formalize
the deﬁnition below.Fix a set of “credible deviating types” C⊂[0,1], and
consider the following speech by bidder j.
“I hereby oﬀer you the bribe, and inform you that my type is a
member of C.You should believe this because my type is in C if
and only if I am better oﬀ making this speech (than in equilib-
rium) for any best response you play, consistent with believing
my type is in C.Furthermore, no other set of types C  can make
a similar speech.”
This speech, if true, creates a sort of self-fulﬁlling prophecy.If bidder i
believes θj ∈C , then he should form posterior beliefs with support restricted
9Such types exist because, for example, the expected payment of type θj =1i sE(θi),
which is larger than b.
12to C, and play a corresponding best response.In that case, the only briber
types who would proﬁt from making this speech for any such best response
are those in C.Therefore, bidder i would be justiﬁed in believing θj ∈C .
The uniqueness of C merely weakens our requirement, and ensures that
bidder i need not worry about why one speech was made instead of another.
If such a speech can be made truthfully, we say that this set of types C
breaks the no-bribing equilibrium.Our result in the ﬁxed-bribe model is that
a no-bribing equilibrium is always broken by a unique such set of types.For
more general situations and games (e.g. with more than two actions available
to the sender in a signalling game), such a speech is deﬁned with respect to
a given equilibrium, a set of types, and an out-of-equilibrium action.
Remark 2 Our speech states that θj ∈Cwhenever θj gains from making
the speech for any corresponding best response by bidder i.The Intuitive
Criterion can be described by a similar speech in which θj ∈Cwhenever θj
gains for some corresponding best response by bidder i.Perfect Sequential
Equilibrium also can be described similarly, where θj ∈Cwhenever θj gains
when i’s best response is formed only with respect to Bayesian updating on
C,i .e . i’s posteriors are not allowed to vary.Uniqueness of the set C is not
required, however, in the deﬁnition of Perfect Sequential Equilibrium (see
vanDamme’s (1991) remarks, p.291). 10
To formalize our concept, we ﬁrst give a loose description in terms of a
general signalling game.Then, we more formally interpret the deﬁnition to
our speciﬁc model.A similar formal interpretation is given for the variable-
bribe model in Section 4.2.
Consider a 2-agent game in which a Sender has an unknown type and
sends a (possibly costly) message to a Receiver.Suppose an equilibrium ex-
ists in which some message m is never sent.We say that a closed, measurable
set of (Sender’s) types, C,i saset of credible deviating types that breaks the
equilibrium with message m when the following hold.
10It is easy to show, as we do in Appendix II, that the no-bribing equilibrium is not a
Perfect Sequential Equilibrium.
131.Let D(C,m) be the set of Sender types who are strictly better oﬀ than
in the equilibrium whenever the Receiver plays any best response to m
consistent with posterior beliefs restricted to C.
2.We require C = closure(D(C,m)).
3.We require that there exist no other (measurable) set of types C   = C
for which C  = closure(D(C ,m)).
In the ﬁxed-bribe model of this section, there are only two types of equi-
libria: the essentially unique bribing equilibrium discussed in Section 3.1
and equilibria in which bribing does not occur.Since the former has no
out-of-equilibrium actions on the part of bidder j, for the sake of brevity
we formalize our deﬁnition only with respect to the no-bribing equilibrium.
Furthermore, briber j has only two “messages” in this game, and “oﬀer b”i s
the one that is not played in this equilibrium.
For any closed set of types C, in order to calculate D(C) ≡ D(C,oﬀer), we
need to determine bidder i’s set of best responses when he believes θj ∈C .
Analogous to the result in Proposition 1, a best response for i is to accept
the bribe whenever θi ∈ [0,A ,w h e r eA is determined by some beliefs of i
over C.In fact, for such beliefs, G, A is such that
b = G(A)[A − E(θj | θj ≤ A)]
(see eqn.( 1)) where the expectation is with respect to G.
Let the set of such best responses be parameterized by
A(C)={A : b = G(A)[A − E(θj | θj ≤ A)] for some beliefs G over C}
i.e. the set of such best responses is {[0,A : A ∈ A(C)}.The set of types
who would want to make the speech described earlier can now be deﬁned as
14follows.11
D(C)={θj ∈ [0,1 ]:i n e q u a l i t y( 2) holds strictly ∀A ∈ A(C)}
Finally, in the ﬁxed-bribe model of this section, a set of types C is a credible
deviating set if it is the unique set for which C = closure(D(C)).
Lemma 1 With respect to a no-bribing equilibrium, a set of credible devi-
ating types must be of the form C =[ c,1],w h e r et y p eθj = c is indiﬀerent
between oﬀering the bribe and not when i accepts with types θi ∈ [0,c+ b .
In other words,
F(c + b)(c − b)=
  c
0
(c − x)dF(x). (5)
Our result is that a no-bribing equilibrium cannot be robust to the kind
of speech described above, since a (unique) set of credible deviating types
always exists.
Proposition 4 For any b<E(θi) and any distribution F, any no-bribing
sequential equilibrium is broken by a unique set of credible deviating types
who oﬀer the bribe.
Proof: Using the same techniques as in the proof of Proposition 1,e q n .( 5)
can be uniquely solved for c. 
Hence, only the bribing equilibrium of Section 3.1 survives.
4V a r i a b l e B r i b e s
In this section, we examine the model in which j may oﬀer any amount b to
bidder i.As a simpliﬁcation, we equate the act of oﬀering a bribe of b =0
with the act of oﬀering no bribe.12 Therefore, a strategy for j is simply a
11We omit from the notation the label for the “message” of oﬀering the bribe.
12Under any reasonable equilibrium concept, this assumption changes nothing in the
analysis.
15function mapping types into oﬀers, b:[ 0 ,1] → R+.A strategy for i speciﬁes
a measurable set of accepting types for each oﬀer b ∈ R+, A(b) ⊆ [0,1].A
sequential equilibrium is deﬁned analogously to the previous section (with i’s
beliefs over types θj conditional on receiving any oﬀer b ∈ R+).
Certain results from the previous section carry over to this one.In par-
ticular, bidder i’s equilibrium strategies must be such that any oﬀer b ∈ R+
is accepted by sets of the form A(b)=[ 0 ,A(b) .For bidder j, Proposition 1
generalizes in the following way.
Lemma 2 In any sequential equilibrium, j’s strategy b(θj), is weakly mono-
tonic in θj.
From this, it follows that in any equilibrium, if two amounts b,b  ∈ R+ are
oﬀered in equilibrium, then b>b   implies A(b) >A (b ), where A() deﬁnes i’s
strategy as above.
The type of equilibrium behavior described in the ﬁxed-bribe model can
be supported in this model with an appropriate speciﬁcation of (out-of-
equilibrium) beliefs for i.For example, for any given b<E(θi), the bribing
equilibrium described in Proposition 2 can be extended to this model by spec-
ifying that whenever a diﬀerent bribe b   = b is oﬀered, i believes that θj =0
with probability 1.The no-bribing equilibrium described in Section 3.2 ap-
plies with similar beliefs.Such beliefs are, of course, unappealing, and do
not survive typical reﬁnements used in signalling games with continuous type
spaces.
On the other hand, there may exist an equilibrium in which j’s strat-
egy b() is continuous.Under the assumption that F is log concave, we will
prove that there is such equilibrium, and that it is unique (up to the speciﬁca-
tion of i’s out-of-equilibrium behavior).Furthermore, under our reﬁnement,
any equilibrium bribing function must at least partially agree with this con-
tinuous function.
For the remainder of this section, we make the (widely used) assumption
16that F is log concave: d[F(θj)/F  (θj)]/dθj ≥ 0.13 Bagnoli and Bergstrom (1989)
provide an extensive list of distributions that are log concave.
4.1 Continuous Equilibrium Bribing Function
In the continuous bribing equilibrium, b() is strictly increasing on some in-
terval [0, ¯ θ), and is constant on [¯ θ,1].Therefore, if i receives some oﬀer
b(θj) <b (¯ θ), then j’s type θj is perfectly revealed.In this case, i accepts the
oﬀer only if the bribe b(θj) exceeds his (perfectly anticipated) payoﬀ in the
auction, θi − θj, i.e. when θi <θ j + b(θj).
In order for j to have the incentive to reveal his type (e.g. not to pretend
to be a slightly higher type), a local incentive compatibility condition must
be satisﬁed.An increase in the amount of bribe oﬀered must be exactly oﬀset
by the increase in the set of types θi who would accept it.This leads to a
diﬀerential equation (6) characterizing the bribing function.
Proposition 5 Suppose F is log concave. In any sequential equilibrium in
which bribing occurs, if j’s bribing strategy function b() is continuous, then






F  (θj + b(θj))(θj − b(θj))
F(θj + b(θj)) − F  (θj + b(θj))(θj − b(θj))
if θj + b(θj) < 1
0 otherwise
(6)
Conversely, there exists a sequential equilibrium in which j’s (continuous)
strategy b() is described by eqn. (6), with b(0) = 0.
From eqn.( 6), it follows that b() is strictly increasing up to some ¯ θ, after
which it is constant, where ¯ θ + b(¯ θ)=1 .
The equilibrium is robust to any reasonable reﬁnement of out-of-equilibrium
beliefs: The only out-of-equilibrium bribe that can occur is b>b (¯ θ).Even if
13Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) relate log concavity to a monotone hazard rate condition.
17all types θi accept this oﬀer, no θj could beneﬁt from oﬀering it because all
types θi already accept the smaller (equilibrium) bribe b(¯ θ).
When F is not log concave, a continuous bribing function b satisfying (6)
may or may not exist.Tedious diﬃculties arise when F is such that b (θj)=
∞ for some θj.Without the log concavity assumption, it may be that any
b() satisfying eqn.( 6) is discontinuous, in which case there is no sequential
equilibrium where j has a continuous strategy.Intuitively, some type θj
may see “increasing returns” from increasing the amount of his bribe, if his
increased expenditure is more than oﬀset by the increase in the density of
types θi that accept the higher bribe.
Even without log concavity, the equilibrium payoﬀs to the bidders must
be continuous.While this is not a surprising result, we state it here formally,
as it is used to prove a later result.To do so, ﬁrst deﬁne j’s payoﬀ from




(θj − x)dF(x). (7)
With respect to a given pair of equilibrium strategies for i and j, A() and
b(), denote j’s equilibrium payoﬀ by
π
e(θj) ≡ π(b(θj),θ j).
Lemma 3 Let b() and A() be deﬁned with respect to given sequential equi-
librium strategies. The briber’s equilibrium proﬁt function πe() is continuous
in θj.
4.2 Reﬁnements under Variable Bribes
Our main result in this section describes the briber’s strategy in any equi-
librium that satisﬁes the reﬁnement introduced in Section 3.3.Such brib-
ing functions b() must agree with the function described in Proposition 5
(eqn.( 6)) on some interval [0, ˆ θj , and remain constant afterwards.Further-
18more, there is a discontinuity at ˆ θj unless b() coincides with the continuous
strategy described in Proposition 5.
Before presenting that result, we formalize the concept of our reﬁnement
for this variable-bribe model.In the ﬁxed-bribe model, there could be at
most one out-of-equilibrium action for bidder j.Here, our reﬁnement not
only rules out no-bribing equilibria, but also rules out some equilibria in
which bribes are oﬀered.In formalizing the requirement, we need to account
for the possible multiplicity of out-of-equilibrium actions (oﬀers) that bidder j
may use.
Fix equilibrium strategies for i and j, deﬁning functions A() and b() as
above.For any measurable (and closed) set of types C,a n do ﬀ e rb ∈ R+,
we wish to determine the set of types θj who are better oﬀ oﬀering b (than
in equilibrium) whenever i believes θj ∈C .To determine this set, we need
to determine bidder i’s set of best responses to this oﬀer when he believes
θj ∈C .As in Section 3.3, we can parameterize this set of i’s best responses
to the oﬀer of b as
A(C,b)={A : b = G(A)[A − E(θj | θj ≤ A)] for some beliefs G over C}
i.e. “accept b if and only if θi ∈ [0,A ” is a best response under beliefs
restricted to C if and only if A ∈ A(C,b).
The set of briber types θj who would strictly want to oﬀer b (and make
the speech described earlier) can now be deﬁned as
D(C,b)={θj ∈ [0,1] : F(A)(θj − b)+Eθi((θj − θi)1(A<θi≤θj)) >π
e(θj)
∀A ∈ A(C,b)}
As e to ft y p e sC is a credible deviating set for oﬀer b if it is the unique
set (given b) for which C = closure(D(C,b)).14
Our result is that if an equilibrium is such that no credible deviating set
14We require the uniqueness of C only for some oﬀer b. There may exist another credible








ˆ θj ¯ θj 1 0
Figure 1: The structure of an equilibrium bribing function b() under our
reﬁnement. The function described in Proposition 5 is labelled b∗().
exists for any b ∈ R+,t h e nj’s strategy must agree with the one described in
Proposition 5 for low types, and must involve “pooling” for all other types.
See Figure 1.
Proposition 6 Assume F is log concave. Suppose a sequential equilibrium
satisﬁes our reﬁnement in the variable bribes model: there exists no out-of-
equilibrium oﬀer b ∈ R+ and set of types C such that C is a credible devi-
ating set for oﬀer b. Denote the bribing function described in Proposition 5
(eqn. (6)) by b∗().
Then bidder j’s strategy b() is such that for some ˆ θj ≤ ¯ θ,
b(θj)=
 
b∗(θj) if θj < ˆ θj
ˆ b ≡ ˆ θj − F(ˆ θj + ˆ β)(ˆ θj − ˆ β) if ˆ θj <θ j
where ˆ β = limθj ˆ θj b(θj). Furthermore, E[θj | θj ≥ ˆ θj]+ˆ b ≥ 1, implying both
ˆ θj > 0 and that ˆ b is accepted by all types θi.
Conversely, any function b() satisfying these conditions is part of a se-
quential equilibrium satisfying our reﬁnement.
205 Numerical Example: Uniform Distribution
In this section, we illustrate some of our results with a numerical example
in which the valuations are drawn from a uniform distribution.We consider
the case of a ﬁxed bribe amount b.
As a preliminary, we derive θi’s expected payoﬀ in the SPA conditional
on θj ≥ B.
E[πi(θi | θj ≥ B)] =
  θi







if θi >B , (8)
and 0 if θi ≤ B.Note that the unconditional proﬁt is E[πi(θi | θj ≥ 0)] =
  θi
0 (θi − x)dx = 1
2θ2
i.
First, we verify that in the case of uniform distributions the no-bribing
equilibrium is ruled out by iterated dominance.Given b>0, we deﬁne
θb a c c o r d i n gt oe q n .( 3)t h a ti s ,θb − b = 1
2(θb)2,s ob = θb − 1
2(θb)2.By
Proposition 2, the no-bribing equilibrium is dominated if and only if eqn.( 4)
holds, i.e., b<1


















eqn.( 4) holds and the no-bribing equilibrium is dominated.
Second, we calculate the ﬁxed-bribe equilibrium (b,B,A)w h e r eA =1 .





From eqn.( 9), using A =1 ,
B − b =
  B
0

















Table 1: Equilibrium values of B and A for various bribe levels b, under
the uniform distribution.
accept, the bribe is b ≈ 0.309, and θj ≥ B ≈ 0.382 oﬀer it.
There is a continuum of other “semi-pooling” equilibria (b,B,A), which
solve the following counterparts of eqns.( 10)a n d( 9).










Some solutions are given in Table 1.
Finally, the “mostly-separating” equilibrium of Proposition 5 is even eas-
ier to compute.Since the likelihood-ratio function is L(x) ≡ F  (x)/F(x)=
1/x, the diﬀerential equation for b(θj)—eqn.( 6)—simpliﬁes to
b
 (θj)=
[θj − b(θj)]/[θj + b(θj)]





which admits a linear solution, b(θj)=1
2θj (the initial condition is b(0) = 0).
This bribe function is valid for θj ∈ [0, 2
3]; b(θj) ≡ 1
3 for all θj ∈ [2
3,1].In the




2θj if θj ∈ [0, 2
3)
1
3 if θj ∈ [2
3,1]
.
Clearly, the briber is better oﬀ in the bribing equilibrium than in the no-
22bribing equilibrium because his surplus in the no-bribing equilibrium (ordi-
nary SPA) would be equal to that in a ﬁrst-price auction where he would bid
θj/2 (instead of bribing with that amount) and win much less often.
6 Conclusion
We have examined a simple, speciﬁc form of collusion among two bidders
in a second price auction, where one of the bidders is permitted to pay the
other to commit to leave the auction (bid zero).Regardless of whether the
bribing agent is permitted to oﬀer only an exogenously ﬁxed payment or
is permitted to choose any payment, a robust equilibrium exists in which
bribing occurs.In an equilibrium for the latter case, a bribe is oﬀered with
probability one.In these equilibria, the object is allocated ineﬃciently with
positive probability.
Equilibria in which bribing does not occur are not robust to intuitive
reﬁnements.Therefore, depending on the solution concept an auctioneer
uses, he may be unable to rationalize the use of this auction even on the
basis of the existence of a collusion-free equilibrium.
Our approach diﬀers from much of the collusion literature in a few ways.
Foremost, we do not model a “collusion design” problem for the agents.In
that literature, it is typical to assume that an uninterested third party designs
and administers a revelation mechanism, making or receiving payments from
bidders based on various information.15 The third-party design assumption
is a way to escape the issue of information transmission in the design stage:
If we make the more-realistic assumption that bidders already have some
idea about their types at the design stage, then when a bidder proposes the
use of a particular collusive mechanism, information about his type could be
inferred from that proposal.16
15See Marshall and Marx (2002) for a case-by-case analysis of the types of post-auction
information that could be used.
16See Jackson and Wilkie (2001) for one approach to modelling this issue, where agents
simultaneously propose and commit to contingent transfer mechanisms, and ﬁnal payments
23This type of inference is a part of what we model.In our model, there
is common knowledge about whether agent j desired to seek collusion, while
that information exists about i whenever j makes the oﬀer.Analogously
to the way information can be lost in moving from an extensive-form game
to a normal-form game, a collusive revelation mechanism may or may not
“naturally” model the information transmission that occurs when the “un-
interested third party” does not actually exist.
We believe that our approach to modelling collusion can provide useful
insights in more general settings as well.Our game is decidedly simple in
that we consider a dominance-solvable mechanism (a second-price auction),
where informational inferences do not directly aﬀect the strategic behavior
of any given type.We also restricted attention to two players, which greatly
simpliﬁes calculations without losing the essence of the bribing-signalling
game.
Appendix I: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2: For any b ∈ (0,E(θi)], Proposition 1 implies that
in any bribing equilibrium, briber and acceptor types are of the form  B,1]
and [0,A .Since B ≥ b, standard continuity arguments imply that type
θj = B must be indiﬀerent between oﬀering the bribe and not, i.e., by eqn. (2)





Note that this holds even if B = 1 since bribing is occurring by assumption.
Also, either A =1 ,o rt y p eθi = A is indiﬀerent between accepting the
bribe and not.By eqn.( 1),
b ≥
  A
B (A − x)dF(x)
1 − F(B)
, (10)
are the sum of those proposals.
24and if A<1t h e ne q n .( 10) holds with equality.(From Proposition 1,i f
B =1t h e nA =1a n de q n .( 10) becomes b ≥ 0; if B<1t h e nA>Band
the right-hand side is positive.)
It is helpful to deﬁne the following functions for A,B ∈ [0,1], A ≥ B.
b1(A,B)=B −
  B





B (A − x)dF(x)
1 − F(B)
.
Observe that since B>0, b1(A,B) <B .
To prove the existence of an equilibrium, we need to ﬁnd A,B such that
eqns.( 9)a n d( 10) hold, that is, b = b1(A,B) ≥ b2(A,B), with equality if
A<1.
Deﬁne
H = {(A,B):A ≥ B, b1(A,B) − b2(A,B) ≥ 0, with equality if A<1}.
We claim that (i) for all B, there exists A such that (A,B) ∈ H, and (ii) for
all A<1, there exists a unique B such that (A,B) ∈ H.
T os e e( i ) ,ﬁ r s tn o t et h a t( 0 ,0) ∈ H. For B>0, b1(B,B) − b2(B,B)=
E[θi | θi ≤ B] − 0 > 0s oe i t h e r( 1 ,B) ∈ H or by continuity, (A,B) ∈
H for some A ∈ (B,1).To see (ii) for A ∈ (0,1), note that b1(A,0) −
b2(A,0) = 0−
  A
0 (A−x)dF(x) < 0, while b1(A,A)−b2(A,A) > 0.Continuity
implies that b1(A,B) − b2(A,B) = 0 for some B ∈ (0,A), hence (A,B) ∈
H. Furthermore, this B is unique because b1(A,B) − b2(A,B) is strictly
decreasing in B (see eqns.( 12)a n d( 14)b e l o w ) .
Deﬁne the correspondence h:[ 0 ,1]  [0,1] such that h(A)={B :
(A,B) ∈ H}.By (ii), h is non-empty and if A<1t h e nh is single-valued.It
can be shown (e.g., by an application of the Maximum Theorem) that h is
upper hemi-continuous.Therefore, for A<1, h(A) is a continuous function,









Figure 2: The set H in the proof of Proposition 2.
of h appears in Figure 2.
























   A
B (A − x)dF(x) − (A − B)(1 − F(B))
 
F  (B)
(1 − F(B))2 < 0 (14)
where the last inequality follows by
  A
B (A − x)dF(x) <
  A
B (A − B)dF(x)=
(A − B)(F(A) − F(B)) ≤ (A − B)(1 − F(B)).
Consider any A  >A .If h(A ) >h (A) then by eqns.( 11)a n d( 12)
we have b1(A ,h(A )) >b 1(A,h(A)).If h(A ) <h (A) then by eqns.( 13)
and (14)w eh a v eb2(A ,h(A )) >b 2(A,h(A)), which implies b1(A ,h(A )) ≥
b2(A ,h(A )) >b 2(A,h(A)) = b1(A,h(A)).Therefore, on A ∈ [0,1), b1(A,h(A))
is strictly increasing in A.
By continuity, b1(1, ˆ B)=b2(1, ˆ B).Therefore, eqns.( 12)a n d( 14)i m p l y
that h(1) = [ ˆ B,1], and b1(1,B) is strictly increasing in B.
Therefore, b1(A,B) is strictly increasing on H in the sense that if A<1
then b1(A,B) is strictly increasing in A,a n di fA =1t h e nb1(A,B) is strictly
26increasing in B.Since b1(0,h(0)) = 0 (by h(0) = 0) and b1(1,1) = E(θi),
the strict monotonicity and continuity of b ≡ b1(A,B)a l o n gH implies that
there exists a one-to-one mapping between b ∈ [0,E(θi)] and (A,B) ∈ H,i .e .
for all b ∈ [0,E(θi)], there exist unique A, B solving eqns.( 9)a n d( 10). 
Proof of Proposition 3: Recall that we assume that players bid their val-
uations in the second-price auction, if it is ever reached (which is consis-
tent with deleting dominated strategies).We begin the process of iteratively
deleting maximal sets of weakly dominated strategies whether or not eqn.( 4)
holds.
Round 1. In the ﬁrst round of elimination, we delete any of j’s strate-
gies that prescribe type θj ≤ b to oﬀer the bribe.This is clear because by
oﬀering the bribe, such a type can only obtain a negative payoﬀ if the bribe
is accepted.For bidder i, we delete any strategy that prescribes type θi ≤ b
to reject the bribe because such a type cannot obtain a payoﬀ higher than
b in the second-price auction.It is straightforward to check that no other
strategies can be eliminated in the ﬁrst round.
Round 2. Subject to the ﬁrst round of elimination, we delete any strat-
egy for the briber that prescribes θj ≤ θb to oﬀer the bribe.To see this,
denote any set of acceptors by A ⊆ [0,1].From the ﬁrst round, we must
have [0,b] ⊆ A.If θj ≤ θb oﬀers the bribe then his proﬁt would be
Eθi[(θj − b)1{θi∈A} +( θj − θi)1{θi∈[0,θj]\A}] ≤ θj − b
where the inequality holds because θi >bfor all θi / ∈ A.Since the LHS
of eqn.( 3) increases faster in θb than the RHS does, we have θj − b ≤
  θj
0 (θj − θi)dF(θi) for all θj ≤ θb.Furthermore, for some admissible A,t h e
inequality is strict.Therefore for θj ≤ θb not oﬀering the bribe dominates
oﬀering the bribe.
Continuing the second round of elimination, we delete any acceptor strat-
egy that prescribes θi ≤ 2b to reject the bribe.This follows because for any
admissible briber strategy, the bribe is oﬀered only by types θj >b , limiting
27the acceptor’s SPA-payoﬀ to no more than θi −b.It is again straightforward
to check that no other strategies can be eliminated in the second round.
Round 3. Similarly, the acceptor’s strategies that we delete in the third
round of elimination are precisely those that prescribe θi ≤ θb + b to reject
the bribe, because the briber’s type is greater than θb if the bribe is oﬀered.
Non-existence. As the ﬁrst of two cases, suppose that eqn.( 4)d o e sn o t
hold.Let θj =m i n {1,θ b + b}.If θj =1t h e nh i sp a y o ﬀi s1− b from oﬀering
the bribe and is 1−E(θi) from not oﬀering the bribe, so θj strictly prefers to
bribe.If θj = θb+b<1, then his payoﬀ is at least F(θj)(θj −b)f r o mo ﬀ e r i n g
the bribe (because each θi ≤ θb + b accepts the bribe according to previous
rounds of strategy deletion), and his payoﬀ is F(θj)(θj − E[θi | θi ≤ θj])
from not oﬀering the bribe.Since eqn.( 4) does not hold, for any admissible
acceptor strategy, type θj’s payoﬀ from oﬀering the bribe is weakly greater
than that from not oﬀering the bribe.Furthermore, since θb + b<1, this
inequality is strict when i’s strategy is to accept the bribe with any type.We
conclude that for θj =m i n {1,θ b + b}, oﬀering the bribe weakly dominates
not oﬀering the bribe, therefore the no-bribing equilibrium does not survive
the iterated maximal elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
Existence. Second, suppose that eqn.( 4) holds.We show that no briber
strategies can be eliminated in the third round of deletion and that the no-
bribing equilibrium can be supported.If the set of acceptors is exactly [0 ,1]
then for all θj >θ b, oﬀering the bribe is strictly better than not oﬀering it
(because θb is indiﬀerent and the LHS of eqn.( 3) increases faster in θb than
the RHS does).
On the other hand, if the set of acceptors is exactly [0,θ b + b], which is
also admissible even after the third round of deletion, then, for all θj >θ b,
oﬀering the bribe is strictly worse than not oﬀering it.To see this, consider
the payoﬀ diﬀerence between not oﬀering and oﬀering the bribe,
E[(θj − θi)1{θi≤θj}] − F(θ
b + b)(θj − b) − E[(θj − θi)1{θb+b≤θi≤θj}],
28which has a derivative equal to
F(θj) − F(θ
b + b) − max{0,F(θj) − F(θ
b + b)}.
This derivative is negative for θj <θ b + b and zero otherwise, so the payoﬀ
diﬀerence is minimized at θj = θb + b, where it equals
F(θ
b + b)(E[θi | θi ≤ θ
b + b] − b) > 0. (15)
Hence for type θj >θ b not oﬀering the bribe is strictly better than oﬀering
it.Therefore, we can delete no more briber strategies: For any θj >θ b,
either bribing or not bribing may be strictly better, depending on the set of
accepting types (and we already established that any θj ≤ θb must not oﬀer
the bribe).
To support the no-bribing equilibrium in which j never oﬀers the bribe
we specify i’s out-of-equilibrium beliefs as follows.If the bribe is oﬀered then
i believes that θj = θb + ε with probability 1.His best response is to accept
if and only if θi ≤ θb +ε+b.For small ε>0, no θj wants to oﬀer the bribe.
This can be seen by perturbing eqn.( 15)w i t hε. 
Proof of Lemma 1: From the monotonicity established in the proof of
Proposition 1 (eqn.( 2)), C must be of the form [c,1]; if type c gains from
oﬀering the bribe so does any type θj >c .It should also be clear that re-
gardless of the value of θj >b , the “worst” of i’s best responses (for j) occurs
when i believes Pr(θj = c) = 1, in which case his best response is to accept
when θi ∈ [0,c+ b  (in fact, the reader may check that c + b =m i nA).The
usual continuity arguments imply that type c is indiﬀerent between oﬀering
the bribe and not oﬀering it, in this worst case (the reader may also check
that D(C)=( c,1]). 
Proof of Lemma 2: Suppose two bribe amounts b and b  <bare oﬀered in
equilibrium.From the arguments of Proposition 1,t h es e to ft y p e sθi that
accept b and b  are [0,A  and [0,A    respectively.Clearly A  <A ,o t h e r w i s e
29no type would oﬀer b.
Let the inﬁmum type who oﬀers b be denoted ˜ θj =i n f {θj : b(θj)=b}.
We show that θj > ˜ θj implies that θj strictly prefers oﬀering b to oﬀering b ,
implying monotonicity.
If ˜ θj = 1, we are done.If ˜ θj < 1, denote the expected payoﬀ to some





As with eqn.( 2), we have ∂π(b,θj)/∂θj =m a x {F(A),F(θj)}.Therefore,
∂[π(b,θj) − π(b
 ,θ j)]/∂θj =m a x {F(A),F(θj)}−max{F(A
 ),F(θj)}.
Incentive compatibility (and continuity) imply π(b, ˜ θj) − π(b , ˜ θj) ≥ 0.
Since ˜ θj < 1, we have ˜ θj <A(as in the second paragraph of the proof
of Proposition 1).Therefore, ∂[π(b, ˜ θj) − π(b , ˜ θj)]/∂θj > 0, and so for all
θj > ˜ θj, π(b,θj) − π(b ,θ j) > 0. 







j),θ j) ≤ π
e(θj)
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the deﬁnition of π and the fact that
θj >b (θj).The second inequality follows from incentive compatibility.
We ﬁrst show continuity approaching from the right.Suppose towards
contradiction that for some θj ∈ [0,1), there exists δ>0 such that for all
30ε>0, πe(θj)+δ ≤ πe(θj + ε).Observe that
π
e(θj + ε) − π(b(θj + ε),θ j | A)
= F(A(b(θj + ε)))ε + 1{θj+ε>A(b(θj+ε))}
  θj+ε









θj (θj + ε − x)dF(x)
+1{θj+ε>A(b(θj+ε))>θj}
  θj+ε
A(b(θj+ε))(θj + ε − x)dF(x)
< 4ε
where the inequality follows because each of the four terms is no greater than




e(θj + ε) − π(b(θj + ε),θ j | A)] = 0.
But then for ε>0 suﬃciently small, π(b(θj + ε),θ j | A) >π e(θj + ε) − δ ≥
πe(θj), contradicting incentive compatibility.Therefore πe is continuous from
the right.
To see continuity from the left, suppose towards contradiction that we
have limθ 
j↑θj πe(θ 
j) <π e(θj).Since π(b(θj),θ  
j) is continuous in θ 
j,w eh a v e
limθ 
j↑θj π(b(θj),θ  
j)=π(b(θj),θ j)=πe(θj).But then for θ 
j suﬃciently close
to θj, π(b(θ 
j),θ  
j) <π (b(θj),θ  
j), contradicting incentive compatibility. 
Proof of Proposition 5: Uniqueness. Consider a sequential equilibrium
in which j’s oﬀer strategy, b(θj), is continuous and where a positive bribe is
oﬀered by some type θj.
Since any positive bribe would be accepted with positive probability (` a
la Proposition 1), it is clear that b(0) = 0.Let θ 
j =m a x {θj : b(θj)=0 }.
For any δ>0 the set of acceptors of a bribe bδ ≡ b(θ 
j + δ) > 0 includes
the interval [0,θ  
j + bδ].Hence the payoﬀ for θ 
j from oﬀering bδ is at least
F(θ 
j +bδ)(θ 
j −bδ) while his payoﬀ in equilibrium is F(θ 
j)(θ 
j −E[x | x ≤ θ 
j]).
31For δ suﬃciently small, bδ < E[x | x ≤ θ 
j], therefore incentive compatibility
requires θ 
j = 0.Therefore b(θj) is strictly increasing at θj =0 .
We extend this argument to prove that b() can be constant only on some
interval whose maximum is 1.For this, suppose that there exists a bribe
b such that {θj : b(θj)=b} =[ θ  
j,θ  
j]w h e r eθ  
j <θ  
j < 1.This bribe is
accepted by θi ∈ [0,A  where A<θ  
j + b because θ  
j <θ  
j.Deﬁne c =
θ 
j + b − A>0.17 For any δ>0( a n dθ 
j + δ ≤ 1), the set of types that
accept a bribe bδ = b(θ 
j +δ)i sa ni n t e r v a l[ 0 ,A δ ,w h e r eAδ ≥ min{θ 
j +b,1}.
Hence Aδ ≥ A + c.If θ 
j oﬀers bδ then his payoﬀ is F(Aδ)(θ 
j − bδ).His
equilibrium payoﬀ is F(A)(θ 
j −b)w h e nA ≥ θ 
j,a n di sa tm o s tF(θ 
j)(θ 
j −b)
when A<θ  
j.As δ → 0, we have bδ → b.However, Aδ − A ≥ c>0a n d
Aδ −θ 
j ≥ min{b,1 −θ 
j} > 0, therefore type θ 
j has a strict incentive to oﬀer
bδ instead of b for δ suﬃciently close to 0.We conclude that if b() is constant
on a non-degenerate interval [θ  
j,θ  
j] then it is constant on [θ  
j,1] also.
We have established that the equilibrium bribe-function, b(), is strictly
increasing on an interval [0, ˆ θ] and constant on [ˆ θ,1].For any θj ∈ [0, ˆ θ],
if j oﬀers bribe b(θj), then it is accepted by types θi ∈ [0,θ j + b(θj)].His
equilibrium payoﬀ is
π
e(θj)=π(b(θj),θ j)=F(θj + b(θj))(θj − b(θj))
Furthermore, the Envelope Theorem implies
d
dθj
π(b(θj),θ j)=F(θj + b(θj))
Therefore,
F
 (θj + b(θj))(1 + b
 (θj))(θj − b(θj)) = F(θj + b(θj))b
 (θj).
Therefore b () is deﬁned by eqn. 6.
17Note that A = 1 would require θ 
j = 1, otherwise any θj >θ  
j should not oﬀer any
bribe greater than b. Therefore A<1 also.
32Finally, we show that ˆ θ = ¯ θ where ¯ θ is deﬁned to be the lowest type
such that β(θj)+θj = 1.Suppose that ˆ θ<¯ θ.For δ ≥ 0 denote the set of
types that accept b(ˆ θ −δ)b y[ 0 ,a δ].Notice that aδ is discontinuous at δ =0
because ˆ θ+b(ˆ θ) < 1.Therefore, for suﬃciently small δ>0, type ˆ θ−δ has a
strict incentive to oﬀer b(ˆ θ), which is a contradiction.On the other hand, if
ˆ θ>¯ θ then type ¯ θ + ε could strictly gain by oﬀering b(¯ θ), which is accepted
by all types θi ∈ [0,1], also a contradiction.
Existence. When F is log concave, eqn. 6 (and the requirement b(0) = 0)
uniquely deﬁnes a continuous function.To see that, note that b (0) = 1/2b y
l’Hˆ opital’s rule.Therefore, 0 <b  (θj) < ∞ on some interval [0,ε).
Using local arguments, consider (locally) the inverse of b(θj), denoted




F  (Θ(b)+b)(θj(b) − b)
− 1
when Θ(b)+b ≤ 1.
We claim that Θ(b) is a well-deﬁned, (weakly) increasing and continuous
function, and Θ (b) > 0 almost everywhere.To see this, note that Θ  (0) = 2.














which is strictly positive because (F/F )  ≥ 0 by log concavity, and Θ(b) >b .
Therefore, Θ(b) is strictly increasing in a right-hand side neighborhood of b.
That is, whenever b (θj) becomes inﬁnite, θj is only an inﬂexion point of b(),
and b() continues with a positive and ﬁnite derivative in the right-hand side
neighborhood of θj.This demonstrates the existence of a unique continuous
b() from eqn. 6.
To ﬁnish the proof, we construct a strategy (and beliefs) for i,a n ds h o w
that it and b() form a sequential equilibrium.
We show that θj > 0 implies b(θj) <θ j to establish that it is rational
33for θj to oﬀer b(θj).Since b (0) = 1/2, b(θj) <θ j holds suﬃciently close to
θj =0 .L e t θ 
j =m i n {θj : b(θj) ≥ θj} (assuming by contradiction that the
set is nonempty).By continuity, b(θ 
j)=θ 
j > 0.This implies b (θ 
j)=0 .
Since b  is also continuous, this implies b(θ 
j −  ) ≥ θj −  , a contradiction.
This implies that b (θj) is positive whenever θj +b(θj) < 1 (i.e. whenever
b  is not explicitly deﬁned to be zero).Therefore, b() is invertible on [0,b(¯ θj)).
To construct the equilibrium, the acceptor i believes that an oﬀer ˆ b<b (¯ θ)
comes from type θj = b−1(ˆ b); an oﬀer of b(¯ θ) comes from some type in [¯ θ,1],
where i’s beliefs are a Bayesian update of F over that interval.Let i’s beliefs
for any out-of-equilibrium oﬀer ˆ b>b (¯ θ) be the same posterior over [¯ θ,1].An




b−1(ˆ b)+ˆ b if ˆ b<b (¯ θj)
1i f ˆ b ≥ b(¯ θj)
Note that A() is continuous and diﬀerentiable everywhere except ˆ b = b(¯ θ).
For j,o ﬀ e r i n gˆ b>b (¯ θ) is strictly dominated by oﬀering b(¯ θj).Therefore
to check incentive compatibility, it suﬃces to check that no type θj prefers
to oﬀer ˆ b ≤ b(¯ θ), i.e. where ˆ b = b(ˆ θj) for some ˆ θj.
To prove this, ﬁrst consider the quantity




(see eqn.( 7)) which can be written as

   
   
  ˆ θj+b(ˆ θj)
ˆ θj F(ˆ θj + b(ˆ θj))dx +
  θj
ˆ θj+b(ˆ θj)(θj − x)F(x)dx if ˆ θj + b(ˆ θj) ≤ θj
  θj
ˆ θj F(ˆ θj + b(ˆ θj))dx if ˆ θj ≤ θj < ˆ θj + b(ˆ θj)
−
  ˆ θj
θj F(x + b(x))dx if θj < ˆ θj.





F(θj + b(θj)) if θj < ¯ θ
1i f θj ≥ ¯ θ
(which can be veriﬁed either directly or via the Envelope Theorem), we have





ˆ θj F(min{x + b(x),1})dx if ˆ θj ≤ θj
−
  ˆ θj
θj F(x + b(x) ∧ 1)dx if θj < ˆ θj.
Comparing these two quantities reveals
π(b(θj),θ j) − π(b(ˆ θj), ˆ θj) ≥ π(b(ˆ θj),θ j) − π(b(ˆ θj), ˆ θj)
implying incentive compatibility. 
Proof of Proposition 6: The proof involves demonstrating various prop-
erties of b() under our reﬁnement.Suppose that b() is discontinuous at some
point ˆ θj, so by monotonicity (Lemma 2),
b






We show (Step 1) that there cannot be pooling to the left of ˆ θj,i .e . b−1(b )i s
either empty or a singleton.In Step 2 we show that there has to be pooling to
the right of ˆ θj,i .e . b−1(b  ) is a nondegenerate interval.In Step 3 we combine
these arguments to demonstrate the ﬁrst direction of the proof.We prove
the converse statement Step 4.
Step 1 (no pooling on the left).With b(), θj, b,b  deﬁned as above,
suppose towards contradiction that b−1(b ) is a non-degenerate interval  θ 
j, ˆ θj .
We ﬁrst prove that there exists a briber type who could improve upon his
equilibrium payoﬀ by oﬀering b  + ε (for ε>0 suﬃciently small) if this oﬀer
revealed his type.For an appropriate ε, denote the set of such types by Bε.
35Then, we prove that briber types near (above) inf Bε strictly prefer to oﬀer
b  + ε if, as a result of this deviation, the acceptor believes that their type
is inf Bε.These types form the credible deviating set whose uniqueness is
obvious.
Claim 1: For any ε>0 suﬃciently small, briber type ˆ θj strictly prefers
to oﬀer b  + ε (versus his equilibrium action) if this act reveals his type, i.e.
if A(b  + ε)=ˆ θj + b  + ε.
Proof of Claim 1: The equilibrium payoﬀ of a type θj ∈ b−1(b )w h oo ﬀ e r s
b  can be written
π
e(θj)=F(A(b
 ))(θj − b
 )+
  max{A(b ),θj}
A(b )
(θj − x)dF(x).
By Lemma 3, the equilibrium payoﬀ of type θj = ˆ θj can also be expressed
with this equation, regardless of whether he actually oﬀers b  in equilibrium.
Furthermore, since b  <A (b ), πe(ˆ θj) ≤ max{F(A(b )),F(ˆ θj)}(ˆ θj − b ).
Suppose that type ˆ θj oﬀered b  + ε and that this act perfectly revealed
his type to bidder i.Then his payoﬀ would be
πε(θj) ≡ F(θj + b
  + ε)(θj − b
  − ε).
Since b−1(b ) is a non-degenerate interval with ˆ θj =s u pb−1(b ), we must
have A(b ) < ˆ θj + b .Therefore for all suﬃciently small ε>0,
π
e(ˆ θj) ≤ max{F(A(b
 )),F(ˆ θj)}(ˆ θj − b
 )
<F(ˆ θj + b
 )(ˆ θj − b
 ) − ε
<F(ˆ θj + b
  + ε)(ˆ θj − b
 ) − εF(ˆ θj + b
  + ε)
= F(ˆ θj + b
  + ε)(ˆ θj − b
  − ε)=πε(ˆ θj)
proving Claim 1.
Since b−1(b ) is a non-degenerate interval with θ 
j =i n fb−1(b ), we must
have θ 
j <A (b )+b .Fix ε>0a si nC l a i m1s ot h a tε<A (b )+b  − θ 
j.
36Denote as follows the lowest type who would receive a (weakly) higher
payoﬀ if, by oﬀering b  + ε, he would reveal his type to bidder i.
θ
∗
j =i n f {θj : πε(θj) ≥ π
e(θj)}.
Following Claim 1, this type is clearly well-deﬁned.Furthermore, continuity
implies θ∗
j < ˆ θj, while the choice of small ε implies θ 
j <θ ∗
j.
We establish that a credible deviating set (oﬀering b +ε) exists by showing
the following claim—the set of types who are strictly better oﬀ (than in
equilibrium) oﬀering b  +ε and being (mis-)identiﬁed as type θ∗
j has positive
measure, and has an inﬁmum of θ∗
j.The credible deviating set is then simply
deﬁned as the set of all such types, including θ∗
j.
Denote the deviation payoﬀ to type θj from oﬀering b  + ε and being






  + ε)(θj − b
  − ε).
Claim 2: For suﬃciently small δ>0, we have πd(θ∗
j + δ) >π e(θ∗
j + δ),
while θj <θ ∗
j implies πd(θj) <π e(θj).
Proof of Claim 2: First, on the range θj ∈ (θ 








  + ε) − max{F(A(b
 )),F(θj)}.
For θj ∈ (θ 
j,θ ∗
j + δ)( δ suﬃciently small), this diﬀerence is positive.That
follows from the fact that A(b ) <θ ∗
j + b  + ε (otherwise θ∗
j would be strictly
better oﬀ in equilibrium than by identifying himself with the more-expensive
bribe b  +ε).Therefore, we have proven the ﬁrst part of the claim, and that
θj ∈ (θ 
j,θ ∗
j) implies πd(θj) <π e(θj).
A similar argument applies to θj ≤ θ 
j, because such types receive an
equilibrium payoﬀ that is at least as great as the payoﬀ they could receive by
behaving as a θ 
j-type, so πe(θj) >π d(θj).Hence θ∗
j is the lowest type who
can (weakly) gain by oﬀering b +ε and having his type revealed, proving the
37claim and establishing the existence of a unique credible deviating set.
S t e p2( p o o l i n go nt h er i g h t ) .Suppose towards contradiction that
b() is strictly increasing on a nondegenerate interval Θ = (ˆ θj,θ  
j).Then for
all θj ∈ Θ, A(b(θj)) = θj +b(θj), implying πe(θj)=F(θj +b(θj))(θj −b(θj)).
Continuity implies πe(ˆ θj)=F(ˆ θj +b  )(ˆ θj −b  ), regardless of whether b(ˆ θj)=
b  .
We ﬁrst claim that for ε>0 suﬃciently small, briber type ˆ θj would
strictly prefer to deviate to oﬀering b   − ε if that act would reveal his type.
A se s t a b l i s h e di ne q n .( 17), πe() is diﬀerentiable from the right at ˆ θj,w i t h
dπe(ˆ θj)
dθj = F(ˆ θj + b  ).Also,
lim
δ↓0
b(ˆ θj + δ) − b  
δ
=
F  (ˆ θj + b  )(ˆ θj − b  )
F(ˆ θj + b  ) − F  (ˆ θj + b  )(ˆ θj − b  )
.
That is, b() must satisfy the usual diﬀerential equation from the right due to
(local) incentive compatibility.Furthermore,
0 <F(ˆ θj + b
  ) − F
 (ˆ θj + b
  )(ˆ θj − b
  )=− d




b=b   .
where the inequality follows from the strict monotonicity of b().Therefore,
for ε>0 suﬃciently small, briber type ˆ θj strictly prefers to deviate to b   −ε
if this act reveals his type:
π
d(ˆ θj) ≡ F(ˆ θj + b
   − ε)(ˆ θj − b
   + ε) >F(ˆ θj + b
  )(ˆ θj − b
  )=π
e(ˆ θj).
By continuity, the same πd(θj) >π e(θj) holds for some θj < ˆ θj.Let the
smallest such type be denoted θ∗
j =i n f {θj : F(θj+b  −ε)(θj−b  +ε) ≥ πe(θj)},
and b∗ = limθj↓θ∗
j b(θj).Consider the (deviation) payoﬀ of any type θj from





   − ε)(θj − b
   + ε).
Using diﬀerentiability arguments similar to previous ones, one can show that




j).Therefore, there exists a nondegen-
erate set of types C, with inﬁmum θ∗
j, who strictly gain by oﬀering b  −ε when
the oﬀer is accepted by types θi ≥ θ∗
j + b  .This establishes the existence of
a credible deviating set, which is a contradiction.We conclude that if b() is
discontinuous at some ˆ θj, then it is constant on some nondegenerate interval
(ˆ θj,θ  
j).
Step 3.In the proof of Proposition 5, we established that in any sequen-
tial equilibrium, if b() is constant on some nondegenerate interval (X,θj),
then it is either constant or discontinuous at θj; Step 1 rules out a discon-
tinuity in that situation, under our reﬁnement.Therefore, if b() is constant
on (X,θj), then it is constant on (X,1].Step 2 implies that if b() is discon-
tinuous at some ˆ θj, then it is constant on some (ˆ θj,X), hence it is constant
on (ˆ θj,1].
We conclude that if an equilibrium satisﬁes our reﬁnement, then there
can be at most one discontinuity point in b(), hereafter denoted ˆ θj (if it
exists), so that θj > ˆ θj implies b(θj)=b  , hereafter denoted ˆ b = b  .Since b()
is continuous on [0, ˆ θj), it follows from the proof of Proposition 5 (or local
incentive compatibility) that b() = b∗() on that range.Furthermore, it is
clear that ˆ θj ≤ ¯ θ.
It remains to be shown that the bribe oﬀered by “high” types, ˆ b, is always
accepted: A(ˆ b) = 1.Suppose towards contradiction that A(ˆ b)=E[θj | θj ≥
ˆ θj]+ˆ b<1.
Since θj = 1 is pooled with lower types when oﬀering ˆ b, he would strictly
gain if he could oﬀer ˆ b + ε and, in doing so, reveal his type to bidder i.
Formally,
F(A(ˆ b))(1 −ˆ b)+
  1
A(ˆ b)(1 − x)dF(x)=π
e(1) < 1 −ˆ b − ε
for small ε because A(ˆ b) > ˆ b.
On the other hand, no type in (ˆ θj,A(ˆ b)−ˆ b−ε] would want to oﬀerˆ b+ε and
reveal his type, since that would involve paying a higher bribe to a smaller
39set of acceptors.For small ε, this interval is nonempty, so by continuity of
πe, the argument extends to type ˆ θj.
Similarly, letting 0 <ε<A (ˆ b) − ˆ θj − ˆ b (which is possible because
inf b−1(ˆ b)=ˆ θj < supb−1(ˆ b)), type θj < ˆ θj would not gain by deviating
to ˆ b+ε and reveal his type.To see this, observe that incentive compatibility
and the choice of small ε imply the following.
π
e(θj)=F(θj + β(θj))(θj − β(θj)) ≥ F(A(ˆ b))(θj −ˆ b)
>F (θj +ˆ b + ε)(θj −ˆ b − ε)
Therefore, the lowest type, θ∗
j, who is willing to oﬀer ˆ b+ε and reveal his
type, exists, and θ∗
j > ˆ θj.Using an argument identical to one in the previous
step, a unique credible deviating set exists in which θ∗
j is the smallest type,
contradicting the supposition that A(ˆ b) < 1 and proving E[θj | θj ≥ ˆ θj]+ˆ b ≥
1.
Finally, the continuity of πe implies
ˆ b = ˆ θj − F(ˆ θj + β(ˆ θj))(ˆ θj − β(ˆ θj))
which proves the ﬁrst direction of the Proposition.
Step 4 (Converse).
We show that for any b() satisfying the conditions of the Proposition, a
sequential equilibrium exists in which j uses that strategy.Bidder i’s strategy
in response to equilibrium actions is obvious; it can be completely speciﬁed as





b−1(b)+b if b ≤ βˆ b
ˆ θj + β if b ∈ (β,ˆ b)
1i f b ≥ ˆ b)
Out-of-equilibrium beliefs which justify this strategy can be constructed so
that upon receiving an oﬀer b ∈ (β,ˆ b), i believes θj = ˆ θj, and upon receiving
40an oﬀer b>ˆ b, i believes θj =1 .
The non-trivial question remains whether there exists a credible deviating
set that breaks our mostly-separating equilibrium.A deviation to b  > ˆ b
is clearly unproﬁtable for all types, no matter what the receiver’s (best)
response is, because ˆ b is already accepted with probability 1, and is cheaper
than b .
No type θj ≤ ˆ θj would want to oﬀer b  ∈ (β(ˆ θj),ˆ b) and reveal his type.To
see this, let θ 
j satisfy b  = β(θ 
j); the deviation payoﬀ is strictly worse than
the equilibrium payoﬀ,
F(θj + b




 )(θj − b
 ) ≤ F(θj + β(θj))(θj − β(θj))
where the latter follows from incentive compatibility.Therefore, a credible
deviating set oﬀering b , denoted B, must satisfy θC
j ≡ inf B > ˆ θj by continu-
ity.Furthermore, continuity implies that θC
j is indiﬀerent between deviating
and not: F(θC
j + b )(θC
j − b )=θC
j − ˆ b.But then for θj ∈ [ˆ θj,θ C
j ), we have
F(θC
j +b )(θj −b ) >θ j −ˆ b, implying θj ∈B , which is a contradiction.Hence
the equilibrium satisﬁes our reﬁnement. 
Appendix II: Supplemental Material on Reﬁnements
Perfect Sequential Equilibrium
At the end of Section 3.1 we claim that the bribing equilibrium is the unique
PSE of the extended game under ﬁxed bribes.Here we put forward a formal
argument.
In a sender-receiver game, for a given equilibrium and out-of-equilibrium
message m, Grossman and Perry (1986) call the beliefs of the receiver (re-
garding the sender’s type, upon seeing m) consistent with the equilibrium
and the prior distribution of the sender’s type, if there exists a mixed strategy
α of the receiver that is a best response given these beliefs, and the beliefs
are generated from the prior applying Bayes’ rule conditional on the sender’s
41type being in the set of types that beneﬁt from sending m when the re-
ceiver’s response to m is α.A Perfect Sequential Equilibrium is a sequential
equilibrium that satisﬁes this additional consistency requirement.
Clearly, the bribing equilibrium of the extended game (under ﬁxed bribes)
satisﬁes this requirement, as there are no out-of-equilibrium moves for the
briber.In light of Propositions 1–3 (in the text), the only other candidate for
PSE is the no-bribing equilibrium.We now show that any beliefs supporting
the no-bribing equilibrium have to fail the consistency requirement.
In the no-bribing equilibrium of our extended game, Grossman and Perry’s
consistency implies the following regarding the acceptor’s beliefs when he is
unexpectedly oﬀered b.His beliefs must come from the prior distribution
applying Bayes rule conditional on θj ∈ B for some B ⊆ [0,1].By Proposi-
tion 1, his best response is to accept if and only if θi ∈ [0,A ,w h e r eA ≤ 1.
Given this response, player j will be better oﬀ deviating from the no-bribing
equilibrium with type θj if and only if
F(A)(θj − b)+Eθi[(θj − θi)1{A<θi≤θj}] ≥ Eθi[(θj − θi)1{θi≤θj}].
Again, from Proposition 1, we know that this inequality will be satisﬁed
by types θj belonging to an interval  B,1], and therefore by consistency,
B = B,1].From Proposition 2, we know that for a given b>0t h e r ee x -
ist unique A and B satisfying the consistency requirement.In fact, we can
conclude that in the no-bribing equilibrium of our game, but oﬀ the equilib-
rium path (i.e., if b is oﬀered), Grossman and Perry’s consistency requires
the acceptor to behave as in the (unique) bribing equilibrium.Since briber
types θj >Bare strictly better oﬀ in the bribing equilibrium than in the
no-bribing equilibrium, they would deviate and bribe if they had consistent
beliefs in the no-bribing equilibrium.Therefore the no-bribing equilibrium is
not a PSE.
42Cho and Sobel’s D1
Here we explain in more detail the consequences of D1 on no-bribing equi-
libria.This reﬁnement restricts the acceptor’s beliefs regarding the briber’s
type when a bribe is oﬀered out of equilibrium.In the discussion, we focus
attention on the case of a ﬁxed bribe, since the results are even easier to
show in the case of variable bribes.We show that a no-bribing equilibrium
cannot satisfy D1 regardless of the value of b<E (θ).
Recall from eqn.( 3)t h a tθb is the type of bidder j who would be indiﬀerent
between oﬀering the bribe and not oﬀering it, given that it is accepted by
every type of bidder i.Whether or not i will accept the bribe depends on
his beliefs regarding j’s type.For example, if i believes that θj is suﬃciently
high (given the bribe is oﬀered), then i’s best response is to accept the bribe
regardless of his type.
Clearly, if j’s type is θj ≥ θb, then for some best responses of the bribee
(i.e., for i’s beliefs about the briber’s θj that are distributed suﬃciently close
to 1), j would be better oﬀ oﬀering the bribe and so deviating from the
no-bribing equilibrium.Cho and Sobel’s D1 is based on the idea that a
sender type that is “more likely” to beneﬁt from a deviation than another
type—that is, a type that beneﬁts from a deviation for “more best responses”
than another one does—should get “more weight” in the receiver’s updating,
conditional on observing that deviation.
To make this concept precise in our setting, we will say that θ 
j is more
likely to beneﬁt from bribing than θj is when the following is true:
For all A ∈ [0,1], if θj is better oﬀ bribing when exactly θi ∈ [0,A]
accept, then θ 
j is also better oﬀ bribing when exactly θi ∈ [0,A]
accept.
In other words, the set of i’s best responses that would induce θj to oﬀer a
bribe is a subset of the best responses that would induce θ 
j to do so.We will
say that θ 
j is strictly more likely to beneﬁt from bribing than θj if θ 
j is more
likely to beneﬁt from bribing than θj but the converse is not true.
43Let D(θj) be the acceptor type such that θj is indiﬀerent between oﬀering
the bribe and not oﬀering it when the bribe is accepted by exactly the types
θi ∈ [0,D(θj)], that is,
F(D(θj))(θj − b)+Eθi[(θj − θi)1{D(θi)<θi≤θj}]=Eθi[(θj − θi)1{θi≤θj}].
Note that D(θj) is undeﬁned on [0,θ b), but is unique on [θb,1], e.g., D(θb)=1 .
It is easy to see that θ 
j is strictly more likely to beneﬁt from bribing
than θj if and only if D(θ 
j) <D (θj).Furthermore, one may check that
the following are true: D has a unique ﬁxed point, which we label θDiv;
θb <θ Div; D is strictly decreasing on [θb,θ Div] and constant on [θDiv,1];
ﬁnally, b = E[θi | θi ≤ θDiv].Note that there is no type strictly more likely to
beneﬁt from deviation in the no-bribing equilibrium than any θj ∈ [θDiv,1].
After these preliminaries we can formally describe the concepts D1 in our
setting.Here, the acceptor’s updating after a deviation must put “inﬁnitely
more weight” on sender types that are strictly more likely to beneﬁt from
the deviation.Therefore, under D1, i’s beliefs regarding θj after a deviation
must have support on briber types that are the most likely to beneﬁt from
deviation, i.e., θj ∈ [θDiv,1].However, any distribution on this support (or a
subset of it) is permissible.
Proposition 7 For any b<E(θi), there does not exist a no-bribing equilib-
rium that satisﬁes D1.
Proof: Recall that by the deﬁnition of θDiv = D(θDiv), b = Eθi[θi | θi ≤
θDiv].Note also that for all θj >θ Div, b<Eθi[θi | θi ≤ θj].
Suppose that in a no-bribing equilibrium the acceptor’s strategy is to
accept the bribe if and only if θi ∈ [0,a .If the equilibrium satisﬁes Cho
and Sobel’s D1 criterion, then a ≥ min{1,θ Div + b}.This is so because the
acceptor believes θj ≥ θDiv conditional on being oﬀered the bribe, hence he
must accept when θi <θ Div + b.The payoﬀ to briber type θj = a from
oﬀering the bribe is F(a)(a − b), while his payoﬀ from going directly to the
second price auction is F(a)(a − Eθi[θi | θi ≤ a]).Since b<E(θi), we have
44θDiv < 1.Therefore a>θ Div, implying b<E[θi | θi ≤ a].Hence type θj = a
strictly prefers oﬀering the bribe to not oﬀering it.Therefore condition D1
rules out the no-bribing equilibrium. 
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